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POWERFUL STATES, CUSTOMARY LAW AND THE EROSION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH REGIONAL ENFORCEMENT
INTRODUCTION
All people share a desire to live free from the horrors of violence, famine,
disease, torture, and discrimination. Human rights are foreign to no cul-
ture and intrinsic to all nations. They belong not to a chosen few, but to
all people. It is this universality that endows human rights with the power
to cross any border and defy any force. Human rights are also indivisible;
one cannot pick and choose among them, ignoring some, while insisting
on others. Only as rights equally applied can they be rights universally
accepted.
-Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations'
With the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948,2 the international
community formally committed itself to worldwide protection of hu-
man rights. Since then, regional human rights arrangements have
been developed, taking into account the specific social and cultural
characteristics of each region of the world.3 While the international
community has applauded the successes of these regional systems,
4
such efforts are actually a step in the wrong direction. By decentraliz-
ing human rights enforcement away from the United Nations (UN)
system, human rights, once heralded as universal values that cannot
vary from nation to nation or from region to region, are now becoming
increasingly region-specific. While cultural differences must be kept
in mind when universal human rights standards are applied and viola-
tors are prosecuted, the expanding gulf between those rights espoused
1. Kirsten Hastrup, The Quest for Universality: An Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS ON
COMMON GROUNDS: THE QUEST FOR UNIVERSAUTY 1, 21 (Kirsten Hastrup ed., 2001).
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (I), U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
3. See discussion infra Parts II(B), 1lI.
4. Nsongurua J. Udombana, An African Human Rights Court and an African Union
Court: A Needful Duality or a Needless Duplication?, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 811, 849-50
(2003).
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by one state and those espoused by another will only lead to the mar-
ginalization of rights.
The purpose behind the creation of international human rights law
was to bind the states of the world together for the protection of indi-
viduals worldwide.5 The current focus on regional human rights sys-
tems has undermined this purpose of international human rights law
by drawing arbitrary boundaries between people. These boundaries
exclude some people from enjoying rights granted to citizens of other
states. When human rights norms are formed and developed by cus-
tomary international law, those states and regions with the power to
influence custom formation have the power to define human rights. If
the process of decentralization continues on its current path, those
rights valued and protected only by less powerful regions of the world
(primarily the Developing Countries) will disappear completely from
international human rights discourse, being replaced instead by the
will of the powerful. Rather than diverting attention and resources
from the UN system of universal rights, states should work toward a
more democratized UN, wherein the voices of all states are heard.
Only then will human rights truly be "human" because they will be
applied to all peoples.
This comment discusses the marginalization of human rights that
will continue if the current trend toward regionalization continues.
Part I provides background on two competing theories of human
rights: universalism and cultural relativism. It is the debate between
these competing philosophies that has led to the regionalization of
human rights enforcement. Part II describes the established systems
for enforcing human rights on the global level and on the regional
level. Part III compares the regional human rights systems, drawing
attention to similarities and differences in the rights contained in re-
gional human rights charters. Part IV discusses the marginalization of
economic, social and cultural rights resulting from the division of the
draft International Covenant on Human Rights into two separate trea-
ties. Part V discusses the ways in which customary international law
is formed, and the ways in which powerful states can influence cus-
tomary law. Finally, Part VI discusses the marginalization of human
rights resulting from the formation of customary law by regional hu-
man rights systems.
5. See UDHR, supra note 2, pmbl.
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I. UNIVERSALISM VS. CULTURAL RELATIVISM
International human rights scholars generally fall into two ideo-
logical categories: universalists and cultural relativists.6 Universalists
believe a set of legal norms exists and should be applied universally to
all persons.7 Human rights are seen as universal because they "adhere
to the human being by virtue of being human, and for no other rea-
son."8 Accordingly, human rights cannot vary from state to state or
individual to individual. They are to be applied equally and similarly
to all persons, regardless of cultural differences. In attempting to de-
fine "human rights," the universalist scholar Louis Henkin9 stated:
To call them human suggests that they are universal: they are the due of
every human being in every human society. They do not differ with geog-
raphy or history, culture or ideology, political or economic system, or
stage of development. They do not depend on gender or race, class or
status. To call them "rights" implies that they are claims "as of right," not
merely appeals to grace, or charity, or brotherhood, or love; they need not
be earned or deserved. They are more than aspirations, or assertions of
"the good," but claims of entitlement and corresponding obligation in
some political order under some applicable law ....
In other words, rights are inherent in every individual, and all in-
dividuals are entitled to the protection of those rights. Since rights at-
tach to people because they are human, and not because they belong to
particular societies, there can be no cultural or regional variations be-
tween human rights." Hence, rights inherent in a person born in Af-
rica must be the same rights inherent in a person born in Europe. The
rights to which a person is entitled are not defined by the society in
which he lives nor the culture he possesses.' 2 Rather, they are defined
6. See Patrick D. Curran, Universalism, Relativism, and Private Enforcement of Cus-
tomary International Law, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 311 (2004). International scholars have also re-
ferred to cultural relativism as "regionalism." JAVAID REHMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 5 (2003).
7. Camilla Elisabeth H. Kjeldsen, Legal and Functional Universality, in HUMAN
RIGHTS ON COMMON GROUNDS: THE QUEST FOR UNIVERSALITY 39, 40 (Kirsten Hastrup ed.,
2001).
8. Rhoda Howard, Dignity, Community, and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 81 (Abdullahi An-Na' im ed., 1991).
9. See Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global
Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 17 (1999) (applauding the UDHR for universalizing human
rights, a concept that had previously been viewed as purely American or French). Henkin
states, "The Universal Declaration is a universal document for universal rights for all human
beings in all societies." Id.
10. Louis Henkin, Rights: Here and There, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1582, 1582 (1981).
11. Curran, supra note 6, at 316.
12. EVA BREMS, HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALITY AND DIVERSITY 3 (2001).
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by virtue of his humanity. 13 Accordingly, "'human rights norms tran-
scend cultural boundaries' . . [so states] are not permitted to pick and
choose the rights applicable to (and enforceable by) their citizens."' 4
In contrast, cultural relativists believe rights are defined by the
particular cultural, political and social context in which one lives. 15
Relativists assert that because there are no universally shared cultural
values and norms, there can be no universal rights.'6 Any system of
human rights protection must "take into full account the individual as
member of the social group of which he is part, whose sanctioned
modes of life shape his behavior, and with whose fate his own is thus
inextricably bound."' 7 Human rights "derive their meaning as values
entirely from the concrete historical contexts and specific cultures in
which they operate."' 18 Because there are no specific trans-cultural
rights or values, no state is justified in imposing its cultural ideas of
right on any other state.'9 As the Chinese delegate to the World Con-
ference on Human Rights in Vienna expressed, "One should not and
cannot think the human rights standard and model of certain countries
as the only proper ones, and demand all other countries to comply
with them."2 Any attempt to define rights in terms of universality
"infringes on a State's right to autonomy. ' '21
Cultural relativists often describe the universal view of human
rights as a form of moral or "cultural imperialism. ' 2  They argue that
13. For a discussion of different definitions of universality, see generally Kjeldsen, su-
pra note 7, and BREMS, supra note 12, at 4.
14. Curran, supra note 6, at 316 (quoting Susannah Smiley, Taking The "Force" Out of
Enforcement: Giving Effect to International Human Rights Law Using Domestic Immigration
Law, 29 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 339, 344 n.51 (1999)).
15. Id.; REHMAN, supra note 6, at 5.
16. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, Comment on the Universalist-Relativist De-
bate, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CoNTEXT 366, 367 (2d ed. 2000).
17. MARY ANN GLENDON, ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HuMAN RIGHTS 222 (2001) (quoting The American Anthropological Association, Statement
on Human Rights, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 539 (1947)).
18. PATRICK JAMES FLOOD, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 18
(1998).
19. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 16; Richard Klein, Cultural Relativism, Economic
Development and International Human Rights in the Asian Context, 9 TOURo INT'L L. REV. 1,
6-7, 25 (2001).
20. Liu Hiaqiu, Head of the Chinese Delegation, Address at the World Conference on
Human Rights, Vienna (June 14-25, 1993), quoted in Klein, supra note 19, at 6.
21. Curran, supra note 6; Smiley, supra note 14.
22. Renu Mandhane, The Use of Human Rights Discourse to Secure Women's Interests:
Critical Analysis of the Implications, 10 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 299 (2004); Guyora
Binder, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law, 5 BUFF. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 211, 217 (1999); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND
IDOLATRY 20, 58, 76 (2001).
4
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the values of one culture should not be imposed on another culture,
because to do so would infringe on a state's right to autonomy (includ-
ing the right to define culturally acceptable practices). 23 If such impe-
rialism is allowed, relativists fear, culture will become so diluted that
it will lose all meaning.24 "[T]he push to universalization of norms,"
arguably will "destroy diversity of cultures and hence.., amount to
another path toward cultural homogenization in the modem world.
25
II. BACKGROUND TO HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
A. The United Nations System
Though some scholars may argue there cannot be a universal set
of human rights binding and enforceable on all states, due to the rich
cultural differences between states and peoples, the international
community committed itself to such a universal system by adopting
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.2 6 This document arose
out of a desire to elaborate on the vague references made to human
rights in the Charter of the United Nations.17 After the world was
awakened to the atrocities committed during World War II, the inter-
national community dedicated itself to preventing similar atrocities
from occurring in the future by establishing a system whereby human
rights could be protected and abuses punished internationally.2"
The preamble to the Charter of the United Nations (Charter)
states, "the peoples of the United Nations [have] determined... to re-
affirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of na-
tions large and small, and ... to [establish] international machinery"
to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights and "the eco-
nomic and social advancement of all peoples. '29 Article 1 of the Char-
ter states, one of the purposes of the United Nations is "[t]o achieve
international cooperation ... in promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinc-
23. Curran, supra note 6, at 315.
24. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 16.
25. Id.
26. UDHR, supra note 2.
27. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNiVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS,
DRAFTING, AND INTENT 12 (1999).
28. Id. at 36-37; ROSEMARY FOOT, RIGHTS BEYOND BORDERS: THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY
AND THE STRUGGLE OVER HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA 31 (2000).
29. U.N. CHARTER pmbl., available at http://193.194.138.190/html/menu3/b/ch-
cont.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
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tion as to race, sex, language, or religion .... "30
With these statements, the member-states of the newly developed
UN expressed their desire to protect human rights, but did not define
exactly what qualified as "human rights. ' '3' To accomplish this goal,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by
the General Assembly three years later.32  This non-binding declara-
tion was drafted as a "common standard of achievement for all peo-
ples and all nations, '33 representing the fundamental values shared by
all states. Originally proposed as the "International Declaration of
Human Rights," the title was changed to better reflect the truly univer-
sal nature of the human rights it espoused. 34
The UDHR professes, "All human beings are born free and equal
in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and con-
science ... -31 This implies that individuals are born with inherent
human rights by virtue of their being born human (i.e., with "reason
and conscience"). 36 The declaration goes on to list those human rights
to which every person is entitled, regardless of their nationality, state
of origin, race, sex, or other status.37 As such, the UDHR employs a
universalist approach to human rights.
Because the UDHR took the form of a non-binding declaration, it
was later supplanted by two treaties: the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 38 and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).39 Together, these
three documents make up the International Bill of Rights.4° Though
30. Id. art. 1, para. 3.
31. See id.
32. UDHR, supra note 2.
33. Id. pmbl.
34. MORSINK, supra note 27, at 33.
35. UDHR, supra note 2, art. 1.
36. MORSINK, supra note 27, at 296.
37. UDHR, supra note 2, art. 2 (including "the right to life, liberty and the security of
person," id art. 3, the "right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law," id art. 6,
the right "to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal," when
charged with a criminal offense, id art. 10, the "right to freedom of movement and resi-
dence," id art. 13, para. 1, the "right to a nationality," id art. 15, para. 1, the "right to own
property," id. art. 17, para. 1, the "right to marry," id art. 16, and the "right to freedom of
opinion and expression" id art. 19.).
38. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 52, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966), opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
39. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200
Annex (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 49, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. The ideological conflict that led to the creation
and the continuing disparate enforcement of these two covenants is discussed infra Part IV.A.
40. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT'L &
6
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the UDHR does not have the binding effect of a treaty, it has become
the source of international legal obligations because it has risen to the
level of customary international law.41 In particular, the preamble to
the UDHR is significant because "it serves as part of the positive
statement of international human rights law that is the whole of the
Declaration. ' '42 Some scholars claim, in addition to forming part of
the body of customary international law, the UDHR also derives uni-
versal binding force from the UN Charter itself.
The binding effect of the UDHR is a result of the fact that human rights
protection is set out in the UN Charter as one of the purposes behind the
UN itself. The UDHR has been unanimously accepted by the members of
the organization in 1948, as specified and concretized in the rights referred
to in the Charter. The Charter is binding on all members of the interna-
tional community in virtue of their ratification of the Charter. Therefore,
also the norms of the UDHR may be said to derive a universally binding
force from the Charter.43
The international community has accepted the UDHR as an elabo-
ration of those human rights intended to be protected by the UN Char-
ter. Since the UDHR merely clarifies the intentions of those who
drafted the UN Charter, it receives binding force through the Charter.
The International Bill of Rights is enforced by a system of moni-
toring bodies established by the UN Charter and human rights treaties.
Article 28 of the ICCPR established a Human Rights Committee
(HRC) to monitor international compliance with the treaty.44 States-
parties to the Covenant submit reports to the HRC on "the measures
they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized [in the
Covenant] and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those
rights ... ."-4 The ICESCR provides that the Economic and Social
Council is responsible for monitoring state compliance with the Cove-
nant.' Specialized UN treaties, such as the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD),47 the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
COMP. L. REv. 157, n.1 (2004).
41. Johannes van Aggelen, The Preamble of the United Nations Declaration of Human
Rights, 28 DENV. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 129, 132 (2000). The formation of customary law and
its binding effect is discussed below. See infra Part IVA.
42. Id. at 133.
43. Kjeldsen, supra note 7, at 46 (citations omitted).
44. ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 28.
45. Id. art. 40.
46. ICESCR, supra note 39, art. 16.
47. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
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Women (CEDAW),48 the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment (CAT),49 and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),5 ° establish special bod-
ies to aid in implementing the treaties.
In addition to these treaty bodies, the UN Commission on Human
Rights,5" the High Commissioner for Human Rights,52 and other sub-
sidiary bodies5 3 actively monitor human rights on the universal level.
The Commission on Human Rights appoints special rapporteurs and
working groups to investigate possible human rights violations in cer-
tain regions of the world, or in certain thematic areas.54 Communica-
tion and complaint procedures allow states and individuals to report
violations to the appropriate UN body or organ.55 Once informed of
state human rights violations, the UN can pass resolutions requiring
states to comply with international human rights obligations, monitor
state compliance with UN recommendations and impose economic or
military sanctions on violator states.56 In addition, the establishment
of the International Criminal Court allows individuals who violate
human rights to be tried and to be punished.57
48. Convention on the Prevention of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A.
Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1979), available at http://193.194.138.190/htmYmenu3/b/elce-
daw.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
49. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., Supp. No. 51, at 197, 93rd plen. mtg.,
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M.
1027 (1984), modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985), available at http://193.194.138.190/html/
menu3Ib/hcat39.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005) [hereinafter CAT].
50. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 61st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/44/25 (1989), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/
a44r025.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
51. MANFRED NOWAK, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME
104-07 (2003); REHMAN, supra note 6, at 35-37; STEINER & ALSTON, Comment on Charter
Organs, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra note 16, at 597, 600-01;
FLOOD, supra note 18, at 38-41.
52. NOWAK, supra note 51, at 133-34; STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 16, at 599.
53. See NOWAK, supra note 51, at 104-47.
54. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Country and Thematic Special
Rapporteurs (Extra-Conventional Mechanisms), at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2
/xtraconv.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005); FLOOD, supra note 18, at 41-43.
55. NOWAK, supra note 51, at 99-102; REHMAN, supra note 6, at 37-45; ANTONIO
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 363-65 (2001); STEINER & ALSTON, The UN Commission's
Main Procedures for Responding to Violations, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT, supra note 16, at 611, 612; P.R. GHANDHI, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE AND
THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATION 48-79 (1998) (discussing the individual commu-
nication procedure under the ICCPR).
56. See generally REHMAN, supra note 6, ch. 2.
57. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9(1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Mar. 10,
8
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B. The Regional Systems
In an attempt to link human rights more closely with cultural dif-
ferences among states, states concentrated in various world regions es-
tablished systems of enforcing human rights on the regional level.
The regional systems currently functioning are: the European sys-
tem,58 the Inter-American system,59 the Arab system 6° and the African
system.61 While Asia does not yet have a regional system in place,
there are indications such a system will be established in the future.62
A regional charter established each of these systems and, except for
the Arab system, each has a judicial mechanism in place to try human
rights violators. 63 The regional charters include lists of rights that are
protected within each respective system, and provide for procedures
by which individuals can seek redress for violations.64 The systems
have met with varied success, the discussion of which goes beyond the
scope of this comment. Regardless of the apparent success of some of
these regional systems, the current focus on regional human rights ar-
rangements is actually a retrogressive step in the realization of human
rights because the regionalization of rights will result only in the mar-
2005).
58. See Maxime Tardu, The European Systems for the Protection of Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT 135 (Janusz Sy-
monides ed., 2003).
59. See SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1992);
Hugo Caminos, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT 165 (Janusz Symonides
ed., 2003).
60. See Bahey el Din Hassan, Regional Protection of Human Rights in the Arab States
In Statu Nascendi, in HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, MONITORING,
ENFORCEMENT 239-247 (Janusz Symonides ed., 2003).
61. See Daniel D.C. Don Nanjira, The Protection of Human Rights in Africa: The Afri-
can Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION,
MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT 213 (Janusz Symonides ed., 2003); Vincent 0. Nmehielle, De-
velopment of the African Human Rights System in the Last Decade, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 6
(2004).
62. Vitit Muntarbhorn, Asia, Human Rights and the New Millennium: Time for a Re-
gional Human Rights Charter?, 8 TRASNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 407, 413-18 (1998).
63. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConve-
nENG.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2005) [hereinafter European Convention]; American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (enrered into
force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention]; African [Banjul] Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinaf-
ter African Charter]; Arab Charter on Human Rights, Sept. 15, 1994, reprinted in 18 Hum.
Rts. L.J. 151 (1997), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/arabhrcharter.htmIl
(last visited Mar. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Arab Charter].
64. See European Convention, supra note 63; American Convention, supra note 63; Af-
rican Charter, supra note 63; Arab Charter, supra note 63.
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ginalization of rights in less powerful regions, as addressed below.
III. COMPARISON OF REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
Some rights have reached a level of universal acceptance, as evi-
denced by the fact they appear in nearly all human rights instruments.
The right to be free from racial discrimination, for example, is re-
spected by all regional and universal human rights systems.65 Simi-
larly, the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhumane or degrad-
ing punishment has reached the level of universal acceptance,' along
with the right not to be held in slavery or involuntary servitude.67
Genocide is also universally condemned as one of the gravest of all
human rights violations. 68
All regional human rights instruments include rights relating to
fair trials, 69 the right to personal liberty and security 70 and the right to
life. 71 While facially it would appear that these rights are truly univer-
sal because they are protected by all regional systems, they are subject
to differing interpretations. As stated by the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs of Singapore at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vi-
enna, "There may be a general consensus [about human rights]. But
this is coupled with continuing and, at least for the present, no less
important conflicts of interpretation."72 Though some rights are in-
cluded in all regional human rights instruments, they may still be in-
65. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3, available at http:/193.194.138.190/html/
menu3/b/ch-cont.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2005); UDHR, supra note 2, art. 2; European
Convention, supra note 63, art. 14; American Convention, supra note 63, art. 24; African
Charter, supra note 63, art. 2; Arab Charter, supra note 63, art. 2; CERD, supra note 47.
66. UDHR, supra note 2, art. 5; European Convention, supra note 63, art. 3; American
Convention, supra note 63, art. 5, para. 2; African Charter, supra note 63, art. 5; Arab Char-
ter, supra note 63, art. 13; CAT, supra note 49.
67. UDHR, supra note 2, art. 4; European Convention, supra note 63, art. 4; American
Convention, supra note 63, art. 6; African Charter, supra note 63, art. 5; Arab Charter, supra
note 63, art. 31.
68. IAN D. SEIDERMAN, HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE HUMAN RIGHTS
DIMENSION 173 (2001); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, G.A. Res. 260(Ie)A, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951).
69. European Convention, supra note 63, art. 6; American Convention, supra note 63,
art. 8; African Charter, supra note 63, art. 7; Arab Charter, supra note 63, art. 7.
70. European Convention, supra note 63, art. 5; American Convention, supra note 63,
art. 7; African Charter, supra note 63, art. 6; Arab Charter, supra note 63, art. 8.
71. European Convention, supra note 63, art. 2; American Convention, supra note 63,
art. 4; African Charter, supra note 63, art. 4; Arab Charter, supra note 63, art. 5.
72. Michael Kirby, Indicators for the Implementation of Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT 325, 326 (Janusz Symon-
ides ed., 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Wong Kan Seng, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Singapore, "The Real World of Human Rights" address to the World Confer-
ence on Human Rights, Vienna (June 1993)).
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terpreted differently, and thus, not equally protected.
Aside from the handful of rights protected by all regional human
rights bodies, there are a large number of rights that do not have uni-
versal acceptance. The American Convention is the only human
rights instrument to grant a person the right "to be compensated in ac-
cordance with the law in the event he has been sentenced by a final
judgment through a miscarriage of justice. '73 In an attempt to rid it-
self of the continuing effects of colonization, the African Charter
draws specific attention to the right of all peoples to an existence,
74
and the right of colonized or oppressed peoples "to free themselves
from the bonds of domination. '75 The African Charter also requires
state-parties to "undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign economic
exploitation particularly that practiced by international monopolies."76
The Arab Charter includes the right "to form trade unions," 77 the right
"of access to public office in his country, ' 78 and the right "to enjoy lit-
erary and artistic works and to be given opportunities to develop his
artistic, intellectual and creative talents. '79 While each of these rights
is valuable and could be described as a human right deserving of uni-
versal enforcement, their inclusion in regional human rights docu-
ments is problematic, because each of these rights is only protected in
one region of the world. Individuals in other regions are not entitled
to such protection.
One of the most controversial and potentially problematic aspects
of regional enforcement systems is the focus some systems place on
duties, in addition to rights.8 Chapter II of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights deals exclusively with the duties every
individual owes to the state and the society.8" The chapter begins by
stating, "Every individual shall have duties toward his family and so-
ciety, the State and other legally recognized communities and the in-
ternational community."82 The Charter further provides, individuals
shall have the duty "not to compromise the security of the State whose
national or resident he is,"83 "to serve his national community by plac-
73. American Convention, supra note 63, art. 10.
74. African Charter, supra note 63, art. 20, para. 1.
75. Id. para. 2.
76. Id. art. 21, para. 5.
77. Arab Charter, supra note 63, art. 29.
78. Id. art. 33.
79. Id. art. 36.
80. Nmehielle, supra note 61, at 7.
81. African Charter, supra note 63, arts. 27-29.
82. Id. art. 27, para. 1.
83. Id. art. 29, para. 3.
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ing his physical and intellectual abilities at its service,"' and "to pre-
serve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations
with other members of the society. 85
While the notion of duties was not completely foreign to the con-
cept of human rights prior to the enactment of the African Charter,86
the Charter went "beyond the conventional notion that duties may be
correlative to rights, . .. [by] defining duties that are not simply the
'other side' of individual rights, and that run from individuals to the
state as well as to other groups and individuals."87 Many scholars
view the African Charter's imposition of duties on the individual as
problematic because it can be used by a state to actually infringe on
the rights of the individual.88 The duties spelled out in Articles 27
through 29 of the Charter "could be read as intended to recreate the
bonds of the pre-colonial era among individuals and between indi-
viduals and the state. ' 89 Critics of the inclusion of duties in the Char-
ter fear states may "capitalize on the duty concept to violate other
guaranteed rights." 9° Individual duties may be used in this way to
trump individual rights when the two come into conflict. 91
The American Convention on Human Rights also contains a chap-
ter on "Personal Responsibilities." I Article 32 of the American Con-
vention states, "Every person has responsibilities to his family, his
community, and mankind. The rights of each person are limited by
the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of
the general welfare, in a democratic society." 93 The European Con-
vention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, on the other
hand, makes no reference to individual duties.' The European Con-
vention lists only rights that the state owes to each individual citizen.95
These differences between regional systems create disparities in
84. Id. art. 29, para. 2.
85. Id. art. 29, para. 7.
86. See generally Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties under Human
Rights Law, 5 HARv. Hum. RTS. J. 51 (1992).
87. STEINER & ALSTON, Comment on Comparisons Between Rights and Duties in the
African Charter and in Other Human Rights Instruments, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CONTEXT, supra note 16, at 354, 355 (2d ed. 2000).
88. See Makau Wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An
Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 339 (1995).
89. Id. at 368.
90. Id. at 373.
91. Id.
92. American Convention, supra note 63, art. 32.
93. ld.
94. See European Convention, supra note 63.
95. Id.
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the interpretation and enforcement of human rights. Those rights
granted to individuals in one system are often different from the rights
granted to individuals in another system. The creation of these re-
gional human rights systems has drawn the focus away from the uni-
versal nature of rights and led to disparate treatment of individuals
from region to region.
IV. THE MARGINALIZATION OF RIGHTS OCCURRING WHEN
ARBITRARY LINES ARE DRAWN: THE DECISION TO DIVIDE ONE
COVENANT INTO Two
After the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
(UNCHR) composed the UDHR, it began the task of giving legal
force to the ideals pronounced in that document. It accomplished this
by drafting two international treaties: the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights 96 and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights.97 When originally drafted, how-
ever, these two treaties formed one single covenant, containing both
categories of rights.98 The UNCHR saw no need to divide the rights
into categories arbitrarily, since all rights are deserving of equal pro-
tection and thus "all rights should be promoted and protected at the
same time." 99
Those who favored drafting a single covenant feared that dividing
the document into two separate treaties would create a hierarchy of
values, with one category of rights taking precedence over the other. 10
Those with opposing views favoring the creation of two covenants
saw the need to distinguish between those categories of rights that are
justiciable and those that are aspirational. 101 Civil and political rights
were viewed as absolute in nature, making them enforceable, while
economic, social and cultural rights were merely progressive rights
that could not be enforced. 1°2 This view largely stems from the pre-
supposition that economic, social and cultural rights "are resource-
96. ICCPR, supra note 38.
97. ICESCR, supra note 39.
98. NOWAK, supra note 51, at 78. The UN General Assembly originally decided to in-
clude both categories of rights in a single Covenant, but was asked to reconsider its position
by the Economic and Social Council. After reconsideration, the General Assembly was con-
vinced to separate the two categories of rights into separate Covenants. Id at 78-79.
99. Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights,
U.N. GAOR, 10 h Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 28, pt. II, ch. V, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 9.
102. Id.
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intensive and require the direct intervention of governments, whereas
civil and political rights do not involve government expenditure but
merely entail the government's forbearance from interfering with the
rights of the people."'1 3
In the face of stark ideological clashes between Western capital-
ism, with its focus on civil and political rights, and Eastern socialism,
with its focus on economic and social rights, the decision was made to
divide human rights into two categories. 1°4 This division led scholars
to label civil and political rights as "first generation" rights, while
economic, social and cultural rights became "second generation."' 0 5
In essence, first generation rights are those capable of immediate en-
forcement,"° while second generation rights are those necessitating
years, or even decades, to develop because they require governments
to institute positive social policies.107 This differentiation is reflected
in the contrast between Article 2 of the ICCPR and Article 2 of the
ICESCR. The ICCPR states, "Each State Party to the present Cove-
nant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the pre-
sent Covenant, without distinction of any kind .... .1 8 In contrast, the
ICESCR states, "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes
to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-
operation ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view
to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized
in the present Covenant by all appropriate means .... ,10 Taken to-
gether, the plain meaning of these two articles demonstrates states
103. Shedrack C. Agbakwa, Reclaiming Humanity: Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights as the Cornerstone of African Human Rights, 5 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 177, 187
(2002) (citations omitted).
104. For an in depth discussion of the drafting process and ultimate decision to divide the
Covenant into two treaties, see MORSINK, supra note 27, ch. 1.
105. J. Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization: In-
ternational Mechanisms, Non-State Actors, and the Struggle for Peoples' Rights in Africa, 18
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 851, 852 (2003); see also Nsongurua J. Udombana, Articulating the
Right to Democratic Governance in Africa, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1209, 1224 (2003).
106. See Udombana, supra note 105, at 1224.
First-generation rights are negative rights, or "immunitv claims" bv citizens to-
ward the State. in the sense that they limit the Dower of a 2overnment to orotect
oeonles' rights aeainst its Dower. They relate to the sanctitv of the individual and
his rights within the socio-Dolitical milieu in which he is located. They imolv that
no 2overnment or societv should act acainst individuals in certain wavs that would
deorive them of inherent olitical or nersonal riahts, such as the rights to life, lib-
erty, and security of person, freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion.
Id. (citations omitted).
107. See id. at 1224-25; Oloka-Onyango, supra note 105, at 874.
108. ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 2, para. 1 (emphasis added).
109. ICESCR, supra note 39, art. 2, para. 1 (emphasis added).
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ratifying both Covenants must immediately provide civil and political
rights, but must only express a desire to someday provide economic,
social and cultural rights.
Because the ICCPR and ICESCR are independent treaties, each
open for signature and ratification by UN member-states, states are
given the opportunity to sign one, neither or both.' 10 By ratifying only
the ICCPR, some states have taken this opportunity to provide their
citizens with only first generation rights while denying their citizens
second generation rights."' In fact, "[n]early twenty years after the
coming into force of the [ICESCR], over 30% of African states still
[had] not ratified the instrument."" 2 While the ratification percentage
has improved in recent years, powerful countries, such as the United
States, have still failed to ratify the ICESCR. 113 Developed states have
been able to perpetuate the belief that economic, social and cultural
rights are "prohibitively expensive, convincing less developed states
that the path to economic wealth cannot include enforceable" eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights. 4
The division of the originally proposed Covenant into two sepa-
rate treaties resulted in the marginalization of economic, social and
cultural rights. 115 These "second generation" rights are provided less
weight in international legal discourse, and receive far less enforce-
ment than their "first generation" cousins. 116 Members of the interna-
tional community have not only failed to provide active support of
economic, social and cultural rights, but many also "actively hindered
the development" of economic, social and cultural rights." 7 Much of
this is due to the continuing ideological conflict between political sys-
tems, which has changed since the end of the Cold War from an East-
West divide to a North-South conflict. " 8 Generally speaking, civil
110. Although both the ICCPR and ICESCR were adopted by the UN General Assembly
in the same resolution, they were opened to the UN member-States independently. Article 48
of the ICCPR and Article 26 of the ICESCR state each treaty has been opened for signature
by member-States. ICCPR, supra note 38; ICESCR, supra note 39.
111. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Rati-
fications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (as of Oct. 1, 2004), at
http:/www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/RatificationStatus.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2005)
[hereinafter Status of Ratifications].
112. Oloka-Onyango, supra note 105, at 14.
113. Status of Ratifications, supra note 111. The United States ratified the ICCPR on
Sept. 8, 1992. It signed the ICESCR on Oct. 5, 1977, but has not yet ratified it. Id.
114. Agbakwa, supra note 103, at 202.
115. Id. at 200.
116. Oloka-Onyango, supra note 105, at 854-55.
117. Agbakwa, supra note 103, at 204.
118. Oloka-Onyango, supra note 105, at 853.
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and political rights are valued over economic, social and cultural
rights by Western nations, such as the United States and many Euro-
pean states. 19 Economic, social and cultural rights, on the other hand,
are valued over civil and political rights by developing countries, pri-
marily in Africa and Asia. 120
The increased value of civil and political rights in the eyes of the
international community can be seen in the names of the respective
UN oversight committees. The Human Rights Committee oversees
the ICCPR,12 1 while the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights oversees the ICESCR.122 These semantic choices evidence the
value placed on civil and political rights, the true "human rights" and
the secondary place to which economic, social and cultural rights are
relegated.
Though the theoretical equality of rights falling into each of the
two categories was reaffirmed by the international community at the
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993,123 such equal-
ity does not exist in practice. 24 The Vienna Declaration states:
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interre-
lated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a
fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.
While the significance of national and regional particularities and various
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is
the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural sys-
tems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental free-
doms. 2
5
Contrary to this declaration, human rights are not globally treated
in a fair and equal manner, nor are they protected with the same vigor.
Even Human Rights Watch, one of the leading human rights non-
governmental organizations, 126 focused its attention almost exclusively
on civil and political rights during the first twenty years of its exis-
119. Id.
120. Klein, supra note 19, at 31; Bernard H. Oxman & Dinah Shelton, Decision Regard-
ing Communication 155/96 (Social and Economic Rights Action Center/Center for Economic
and Social Rights v. Nigeria), 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 937, 941 (2002) (citing the African Commis-
sion on Human and Peoples' Rights statement "collective rights, environmental rights, and
economic and social rights are essential elements of human rights in Africa").
121. ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 28, para. 1.
122. ICESCR, supra note 39, arts. 16-22.
123. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration].
124. See discussion infra Part IV.
125. Vienna Declaration, supra note 123, para. 5.
126. See Human Rights Watch, at httpJ/www.hrw.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
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tence, and only turned its attention toward addressing economic, so-
cial and cultural rights in the past few years. 
127
In countries such as the United States, the right to vote (a political
right) is vehemently protected, while the right to "the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health" 128 (a social
right), or the right to "an adequate standard of living ... including
adequate food" 29 (an economic right) arguably are not protected with
the same dedication. In other countries, such as China and Singapore,
the exact opposite is true. 3° For example, the United States Constitu-
tion provides, "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to as-
semble,"'' whereas in China:
[M]any individuals who have done nothing but peacefully express views
critical of the Party-state's actions or policies, or attempted to exercise
their freedom of association, even in private meetings, have been sen-
tenced to long prison terms or detained for months or even years without
the benefit of any judicial proceedings.
32
Similarly, in Singapore the government has been able to prevent pub-
lic demonstrations of as few as two people by refusing to grant li-
censes under the Public Entertainment and Meetings Act.'33 Under
Singapore's Internal Security Act, persons deemed to be acting in a
manner prejudicial to Singapore could be held indefinitely without
trial."3 However, Singapore's health system was ranked sixth in the
world by the World Health Organization, partially due to the availabil-
ity of government subsidies to keep healthcare affordable,' 35 while in
the United States millions of people live without healthcare due to the
overwhelming costs of private health insurance. 1
36
127. Human Rights Watch, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, at http://hrw.org
/doc/?t=esc (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
128. ICESCR, supra note 39, art. 12, para 1.
129. Id. art. 11, para 1.
130. Klein, supra note 19, at 10.
131. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
132. Human Rights in China Report, China: Freedom of Association Regulated Away
(June 1, 1999), at http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/article?revision%5fid=17154
&item%5fid=14324 (last visited Mar 10, 2004).
133. Tai-Heng Cheng, The Central Case Approach to Human Rights: Its Universal Ap-
plication and the Singapore Example, 13 PAC. RiM. L. & POL'Y J. 257, 264-65 (2004).
134. Id. at 266.
135. Sonia Kolesnikov, Singapore Looks to Healthcare Changes, UNrrED PRESS INT'L,
May 8, 2002, httpJ/www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID= 07052002-113324-1956r.
136. See Almanac of Policy Issues, Health Insurance Coverage: 2001, Sept. 30, 2002,
http://ww.policyalmanac.org/ health/archive/healthinsurance_coverage.shtml (adapted from
a U.S. Census Bureau Report).
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Arguably, individuals are better off in a State committed to pro-
tecting at least one category of rights as opposed to protecting no
rights at all. However, scholars doubt one category of rights can be
enjoyed fully absent protection for the other category. 37  As one
scholar, Shedrack Agbakwa, states:
Since the different rights are interconnected and operate in support of each
other, it logically follows that the full realization of one set remains de-
pendent on the realization of the other. In a state of instability resulting
from the denial of basic [economic, social and cultural rights], it becomes
difficult, if not impossible, to realize civil and political rights, and vice
versa. 138
Another scholar describes the problem by posing the questions: "what
does it mean to have a right to vote if one is too hungry to lift the bal-
lot paper[, and] [c]onversely, does it matter that you have a right to
food if your freedom to speak out on the lack of it is muzzled?" 139
Because the decision was made to divide the International Cove-
nant on Human Rights into two separate treaties, economic, social and
cultural rights have been marginalized in international discourse and
are provided disparate enforcement. When citizens are denied protec-
tion of one category of rights, their enjoyment of the other category
suffers. Only by uniform and equal enforcement of both the ICCPR
and the ICESCR can any human rights truly be protected.
V. HUMAN RIGHTS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Introduction to Customary International Law
In addition to the process of treaty formation that gave birth to the
ICCPR, ICESCR and other legally binding international instruments,
international law is also shaped by custom. A customary rule is one
that gains legal force through general practice accepted as law. 14
Customary rules are based on consensus. When a majority of states
expressly or implicitly demonstrate general acceptance of a rule and a
137. See, e.g., Agbakwa, supra note 103; Oloka-Onyango, supra note 105.
138. Agbakwa, supra note 103, at 183.
139. Oloka-Onyango, supra note 105, at 858. The idea that civil and political rights can-
not be fully realized without the concurrent realization of economic, social and cultural rights
has been referred to as the "full-belly thesis." For an in-depth discussion, see Rhoda Howard,
The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority Over Civil and Political
Rights?, 5 HUm. RTS. Q. 467 (1983).
140. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1946, art. 38(1)(b), available at
www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm [hereinafter ICJ Stat-
ute]; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 89-90 (July 25).
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belief in its binding force, a customary rule is born. 14 1 General prac-
tice does not require universal acceptance, but essentially requires a
majority of states to "engage in a consistent practice corresponding
with the rule."'4 2 This "majority rules" process results in customary
rules being created, which bind all states, without the need for all
states to consent to such rules. 143 In fact, states are no longer entitled
under international law to defensively claim they are not bound by a
customary rule, even if those states expressed opposition to the rule
before it was formed. 1"
Customary rules can be formed in various ways, either by the
adoption of declarations like the UDHR, 145 by uniform practice among
states in the absence of any written declaration or by the judicial proc-
ess. 146
Judicial decisions do not immediately take on the effect of binding
customary rules, but are often adopted by states into binding national
or multi-national laws. 147 Even in the absence of such express adop-
tion of judicial rulings, states may adopt rules that do not contradict a
particular judicial ruling, thus showing consent to be bound by the ju-
dicially-formed rule.'" In this way, "customary rules are capable of
binding States which have neither participated in their development or
change nor acknowledged their prescriptive force."' 149 Decisions
handed down by the courts of various judicial systems also reach the
level of binding customary law when they are quoted or relied upon
by courts in other systems, thereby legitimizing the rules espoused
therein. 150 Though decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
141. ORIOL CASANOVAS, UNITY AND PLURALISM IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 29
(2001).
142. CASSESE, supra note 55, at 123.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 124.
145. Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human
Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (1996).
146. CASSESE, supra note 55, at 121.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 120.
149. MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES 142 (1999).
150. For example, in the Tadic case, the ICJ held that joint criminal liability existed in
customary international law at the time of Tadic's crimes. Daryl A. Mundis & Fergal Gaynor,
Current Developments at the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
642, 652 (2004) (discussing Judgment, Tadic (1T-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999,
paras. 185 et seq.). This decision was relied upon by the Court in the Milutinovic case to hold
Ojdanic criminally liable under a joint criminal liability theory. Id. (discussing Decision on
Dragolijub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction, Milutinovic et. al. (IT-99-37-AR72),
Appeals Chamber, 21 May 2003). In some situations, a state's domestic courts may be asked
to apply customary international rules. In order to do so, the courts first must determine
19
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do not create binding precedent, the ICJ nevertheless seeks to main-
tain judicial consistency, by following its earlier decisions without di-
rectly relying on them.'5' Accordingly, when the ICJ decides a case
based on the rule it pronounced in an earlier case, it gives legitimacy
to the rule previously announced and makes it more likely that the rule
will be enforced consistently in the future. This process gives the ICJ
a strong influence on the shaping of customary law.
Judicial interpretation is one of the key steps in the development
of customary international rules. When a court is asked to apply a
customary rule, it must first determine whether such rule exists and is
binding on those who are parties to the case before it.152 In making
such a determination, the court must look to general State practice to
see if the necessary consensus exists.153 The ICJ explained in the Case
Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area that the existence of a binding customary rule is determined by
"analysis of a sufficiently extensive and convincing practice" among
States."I4 This can be problematic, because what qualifies as "suffi-
ciently extensive" necessarily will depend on the opinion of the court
or other body conducting such a determination. What is sufficient
practice to evidence a customary rule in the eyes of one court may be
different from what would be considered sufficient by another court.
It is therefore possible for a court to declare the existence of a custom-
ary rule based on fairly limited evidence of state practice, if the court
was so inclined. This was the case when the Permanent Court of Jus-
tice found the existence of a customary rule in The Case of the S.S.
whether such a customary rule has been formed and is binding on the state. This situation is
common when the rule in question is contained in a non-self-executing treaty ratified by the
state, or a treaty the state has signed but not ratified. One author suggests, to decide whether a
state is bound by such a rule, courts should consider the position adopted by the state during
relevant treaty negotiations. Whether the state adopted a strictly universalist or cultural rela-
tivist position during negotiations of treaties on point can be relevant in deciding whether it
would be fair for the state to be bound, because "a nation's universalist stance during the ne-
gotiation of a non-self-executing or non-ratified treaty should serve as strong (indeed, conclu-
sive) evidence of a customary international norm enforceable in that nation's domestic tribu-
nals." Curran, supra note 6, at 317-18.
151. REHMAN, supra note 6, at 21; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 21 (6 h ed. 2003).
152. For example, in the Filartiga case, the U.S. government argued to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit that there existed a customary international rule prohibiting
torture, and that the rule was binding on the government of Paraguay. Memorandum for the
United States as Amicus Curiae in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 19 I.L.M. 585 (1980). The Court
agreed with the argument, and held a Paraguayan official guilty of torture. Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
153. CASANOVAS, supra note 141, at 30.
154. (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 299 (Oct. 12).
20
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"Wimbledon"155 and the U.S. Supreme Court found the existence of a
customary rule in The Paquete Habana15 6 case, each court relying on
the practice of fewer than a dozen states.
5 7
Since there is no hierarchy between sources of international law,
once customary rules are born they bind states to the same degree as
treaty law. 158 Customary rules are more dangerous, however, because
treaties only bind those states that consent to them (by signature and
ratification), while customary laws bind all states.'59 As noted by Mi-
chael Byers:
It is generally accepted that rules and procedures set out in human rights
treaties apply only to those States which have ratified those treaties. Yet
many States and scholars insist that even those States which have failed to
ratify international human rights treaties nonetheless do have international
human rights obligations. 6 °
Once international treaties gain broad acceptance and are relied
upon by courts, those treaties enter the body of customary law and,
consequently, they are binding on all states, even those electing not to
ratify them.
Another critical component to consider regarding customary law
is the effect that attention by legal scholars and publicists has on cus-
tom formation. The Statute of the International Court of Justice (Stat-
ute) lists as sources of international law: international convention, in-
ternational custom "as evidence of a general practice accepted as law"
and general principles of law.' 6' Additionally, the Statute states the
court shall use "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
155. (Fr. V. F.R.G.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1 (June 28).
156. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
157. Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 6 (1988).
158. The Statute of the International Court of Justice lists sources of international law
that the Court shall apply in its decisions, but does not establish any type of hierarchy be-
tween those sources. ICJ Statute, supra note 140. The express wording of Article 38 places
no source of law as superior to the others. Id. art. 38. While some scholars choose to refer to
custom as "soft law," thus downplaying its legal significance, the majority of international
scholars refer to both treaty and custom as "primary sources" of law, clearly indicating they
have equal, binding force. SEIDERMAN, supra note 68, at 28. The only laws that are binding
to a higher degree than treaty and custom are rules that have attained the status ofjus cogens.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334.
The international community recognizes these rules as peremptory norms of international law
from which no derogation is permitted. REHMAN, supra note 6, at 23. Treaties (and other
types of binding law) that conflict with jus cogens norms are void. Id.; BROWNLIE, supra note
151, at 488-90.
159. SEIDERMAN, supra note 68, at 18-20.
160. BYERS, supra note 149, at 43.
161. ICJ Statute, supra note 140, art. 38.
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qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law." 162
Some legal scholars have asserted publicists are the leading
source of customary international law, especially regarding expert tes-
timony addressing customary rules used in United States' courts. 163
When United States' courts decide cases based on the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA),164 they are forced to interpret the ATCA's appli-
cability to sources of international law, including customary law. 65 In
doing so, courts "attempt to ascertain customary international law 'by
consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law...
or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing the law.""'  In The
Paquete Habana case, the United States Supreme Court emphasized
the importance of consulting "the works of jurists and commentators
who by years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves
particularly well acquainted with the subjects" of customary law being
considered by the Court. 167 Courts look to the works of jurists "not for
the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be,
but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is."" The work of
jurists is believed to be a reliable statement of the current state of the
law because jurists "are generally impartial in their judgment" and
their testimony rests on years of experience and study. 169 Plaintiffs in
several cases brought under the ATCA have successfully relied on af-
fidavits from legal scholars that summarize the current state of cus-
tomary international law. 70
One scholar asserts, because the "most authoritative statements
synthesizing customary international law are found in the writings of
publicists.., it is not surprising that United States courts are likely to
accept the conclusions of publicists without inquiring carefully into
the empirical data from which the expert witness draws his inferences
about the content and applicability of international law."' 171 Another
162. Id.
163. E.g., Lillich, supra note 145, at 22-23.
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
165. Curran, supra note 6, at 312.
166. Id. at 313 (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-
15 (9' Cir. 1992)); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
167. 175 U.S. 677, 700(1900).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 700-01.
170. Beth Stevens, Litigating Customary International Human Rights Norms, 25 GA. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 191, 199 (1996). See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass.
1995).
171. Lillich, supra note 145, at 23 (quoting Harold G. Maier, The Role of Experts in
Proving International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts: A Commentary, 25 GA. J.
22
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scholar goes even farther to suggest "states really never make interna-
tional law on the subject of human rights. It is made by the people
that care; the professors, the writers of textbooks and casebooks, and
the authors of articles in leading international law journals."' 72 While
such an assertion might be a bit of a stretch, the comments of both
scholars point to the crucial role of publicists and scholars in creating
customary international laws. If a widely respected and well-known
author asserts a customary rule exists, the rest of the world is likely to
listen, especially if the opinion of that author is cited by a court inter-
preting international law, as is often the case when United States
courts decide cases under the ATCA.
B. The Effects of Power on Customary Law
While the formation of customary international norms can be a
valuable tool for moving human rights protection forward, 7 3 it can
also be a double-edged sword. When customary rules are formed and
solidified by courts and international legal scholars, one must look
carefully at which states are producing the judicial decisions and train-
ing the legal scholars. When the courts and scholars who take a prin-
cipal role in articulating customary human rights norms are primarily
Western, only rights valued by Western states will enter the body of
customary law.
For many years the most prominent international scholars came
almost exclusively from the West (i.e., the United States and Western
Europe).'74 This is not due to any form of superior training or intelli-
gence possessed by Western scholars, but rather because Western
INT'L& COMP. L. 205, 212 (1996)).
172. Louis B. Sohn, The Status and Future of the Customary International Law of Hu-
man Rights: Sources of International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 399, 399 (1996).
173. Many scholars embrace customary international law as a means for progressing hu-
man rights, because customary law can form and change to "respond to moral issues and
global challenges, such as human rights violations." Anthea Roberts, Righting Wrongs or
Wronging Rights? The United States and Human Rights Post-September 11, 15 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 721, 737 (2004).
174. During the 17th and 18'h centuries, political thought was dominated by European phi-
losophers such as Locke ("the father of liberal democracy" and the first to use the term "hu-
man rights" within its current meaning), Rousseau, Grotius, Voltaire and Hume, whose theo-
ries laid the groundwork for modern human rights law. Kirsten Hastrup, To Follow a Rule:
Rights and Responsibilities Revisited, in HUMAN RIGHTS ON COMMON GROUNDS: THE QUEST
FOR UNIVERSALITY, supra note 1, at 58-59; PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 14-16 (1998); FLOOD, supra note 18, at 9-10. Also notable
are Thomas Jefferson, whose writing of the Declaration of Independence inspired human
rights law throughout Europe, and more recently Rene Cassin and Eleanor Roosevelt, who are
credited with drafting and championing the UDHR. LAUREN, supra, at 17; van Aggelen, su-
pra note 41, at 130; GLENDON, supra note 17.
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states speak with louder voices in international relations than do less
developed and less wealthy states.'75 Leaders from Western states
took prominent roles in drafting the UN Charter and international trea-
ties. 7 6 Western states were responsible for organizing the Nuremberg
Tribunal to try Nazi war criminals after World War 11.171 Western
states have also been responsible for organizing military interventions
into states committing gross human rights violations1 8 and for orga-
nizing ad hoc criminal tribunals to try the culpable leaders of those
states.179 The United States, as the one remaining world super-power,
has been able to speak with the loudest voice in international relations,
often imposing its will on states that do not have equally prominent
roles within the world community. 18 0
Law is a reflection of power. 8' Those who have the most power
175. Analogizing the process of custom formation to the "gradual formation of a road
across vacant land," de Visscher wrote, "Among the users are always some who mark the soil
more deeply with their footprints than others, either because of their weight, which is to say
their power in this world, or because their interests bring them more frequently this way."
CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1957), quoted
in BYERS, supra note 149, at 37. States that have such "weight," due to their financial wealth,
high level of technological development and influential positions in the U.N., are able to
"mark the soil more deeply" in international law. Id
176. Ian Johnstone, US-UN Relations After Iraq: The End of the World (Order) As We
Know It?, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 813, 821 (2004) (stating the U.S. was largely responsible for
creating the normative structure of the UN).
177. The four allied powers responsible for organizing the Nuremberg military tribunal
were the U.S., the U.K., France and the Soviet Union. Makau Mutua, Never Again: Question-
ing the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 167, 170 (1997).
178. IGNATIEFF, supra note 22, at 37.
179. Lawrence Eagleburger, the American Secretary of State, was one of the first people
to call for the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugolavia.
Mutua, supra note 177, at 174-75. The United States was also partially responsible for the
failure of the UN to intervene in Rwanda to prevent the genocide occurring there, and for re-
fusing to label the Rwandan holocaust as "genocide." Id at 176. Because the decision to es-
tablish ad hoc tribunals is made by the U.N. Security Council, the five permanent members of
the council are able to decide when and where to establish criminal tribunals. China, the one
non-American and non-European member of the Security Council, has continually expressed
reluctance to create tribunals, and abstained from voting on the resolution that established the
Rwanda tribunal. Michael P. Scharf, The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal
Court, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 167, 169-70 n.8 (1995).
180. Andreas L. Paulus, From Neglect to Defiance? The United States and International
Adjudication, 15 EuR. J. INT'L L. 783, 783 (2004) (arguing that since the U.S. is the sole re-
maining superpower, it has the motive to withdraw from international dispute settlement);
Johnstone, supra note 176, at 815 (stating that because the U.S. is the one remaining super-
power, it is reluctant to accept UN constraints on its foreign policy). The U.S's position as a
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, with the accompanying veto power, gives it
the ability to speak over the will of all other States, with only the four other permanent Secu-
rity Council members possessing the same power. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3, available at
http //193.194.138.190/html/menu3/b/ch-cont.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
181. Bastiaan de Gaay Fortman, The Dialectics of Western Law in a Non-Western World,
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST WORLD: INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVES 237, 238 (Jan
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make the law and enforce it against the powerless. With respect to in-
ternational human rights enforcement, no one state is responsible for
drafting international treaties or shaping the future of human rights
norms, but powerful states can take a prominent role in shaping the fu-
ture of customary law. 182 While in theory all states are afforded sov-
ereign equality, 83 and thus equal entitlement to participate in the for-
mation of customary law, 184 powerful states "often find it easier than
less powerful States to engage in practice which will significantly af-
fect the development, maintenance and change of customary rules."' 85
The ICJ implicitly recognized that powerful states have more in-
fluence on custom formation than less-powerful states in the North
Sea Continental Shelf cases. 86 Regarding evidence of general state
practice, the ICJ stated, "even without the passage of any considerable
period of time, a very widespread and representative participation in
the [Geneva] convention might suffice of itself, provided it included
that of States whose interests were specially affected."' 87 The Court
did not require universal participation in the applicable convention to
find the convention had entered customary international law, but
rather required only the participation of those states that were "spe-
cially affected" by the convention.' 88 Since powerful states have a
"broader range and greater frequency of their activities, [they] are
more likely than less powerful States to have interests which are af-
fected by any particular legal development," so they will almost al-
ways be "specially affected" within the meaning of the Court. 89 Since
the development of customary rules necessarily involves the weighing
of evidence of varying state practice, states engaged in a wider range
of activities, thus having more state practice to which courts and
scholars can look, will have a greater influence on custom formation
Berting et al. eds., 1990). Power, in the sense intended in this comment, refers to interna-
tional might. The most powerful states are those that possess the greatest amount of wealth
and the highest level of economic and technological development, those that engage in the
most wide-reaching forms of international trade, and those with the military power and prow-
ess to engage in international military interventions, be they aggressive, humanitarian, or
peace-keeping in nature.
182. KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (2d ed. 1993).
183. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 1, available at http://193.194.138.190/html/menu3/b/ch-
cont.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
184. BYERS, supra note 149, at 37.
185. Id. at 205.
186. Id. at 37-38.
187. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 20) (emphasis
added).
188. Id.
189. BYERS, supra note 149, at 38.
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than states engaged in limited activities."9 In this way, "the custom-
ary process 'gives weight to effective power and responsibility."' 19'
In addition to the implicit weight given to the practice of powerful
states in assessing the existence of a customary rule, arguably special
weight is (or should be) explicitly given to the practice of such states.
One scholar claims, special weight should be given to "the size of the
State, the volume of its international relations, and, in general, the
contribution that it makes to the development of international law."192
In general, "when authorities examine the evidence necessary to estab-
lish customary law, they consider actions of a limited number of
states, often only the largest, most prominent, or most interested
among them." 193 If this is the case, then powerful states, who are
heavily involved in UN and other international activities, have the
ability to influence the formation of customary law so that it best
serves their interests.
VI. THE INEVITABLE DISAPPEARANCE OF DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES' RIGHTS
The movement away from centralized, UN-governed enforcement
of human rights law will result in the disappearance of rights valued
only by developing countries. Because customary international law is
the primary means for establishing human rights norms, 94 states and
regional systems having the power to influence customary law have
the ability to shape human rights. Regional human rights systems
with more developed courts to enforce human rights violations, which
are "better at publishing their actions and related legal opinions than
others," will produce the judicial decisions to which the rest of the
world will look, as evidence of customary norms. 195 Systems with less
developed court systems will not have the ability to produce the qual-
ity or quantity of judicial decisions of more developed systems. Legal
scholars who hail from the states and regions with the most prestig-
ious schools and the most highly regarded legal journals are able to
produce works regarded worldwide as authoritative statements of cus-
190. Id. at 205; WOLFKE, supra note 182, at 78.
191. BYERS, supra note 149, at 205.
192. MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL ON
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 32-33 (2d ed. 1997).
193. Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 537
(1993).
194. Anthony D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 101,
105 (1987) (labeling custom as the "primary source of international law").
195. BYERS, supra note 149, at 39.
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tomary law, while scholars from other regions are not.
Because human rights are increasingly being divided along re-
gional lines, the power disparities between states will have an even
larger impact than they have in the past. In establishing regional hu-
man rights arrangements, states are setting themselves apart from oth-
ers as distinctly different, and placing, special focus on rights not pro-
tected by other systems. Regions that differentiate themselves by
focusing on distinctly different rights are setting up a clear "us versus
them" dichotomy. Regions labeled as "the other" in the international
community will only increase their marginal position in the world.
Similarly, the only rights they strive to protect will be marginalized.
Just as economic, social and cultural rights were relegated to sec-
ond-class status when they were separated and distinguished from
civil and political rights, region-specific rights will take a secondary
position to universal rights. Rights deemed to have reached the level
of universal acceptance by the courts and legal scholars of powerful
regions will take precedence over rights protected only by one or two
regions of the world, especially when those regions are composed
primarily of under-developed, less powerful states.
CONCLUSION
When arbitrary lines are drawn to distinguish human rights,
whether along thematic or along regional lines, one set of rights takes
precedence over the other. This was the case when the International
Covenant on Human Rights was divided into the ICCPR and ICESCR,
and it will be the case when the European human rights system, the In-
ter-American human rights system, and the African human rights sys-
tem become the primary means of human rights enforcement. In order
to prevent the further marginalization of human rights, the world
community must move back towards the centralized UN human rights
system.
The United States and the European Union currently play the most
prominent role in the human rights regime. 96 If this monopolization
continues, as will be the case if the European Union continues to gain
power, rights that are non-Western in origin will disappear from hu-
man rights discourse. As one author describes, "Western monopoliza-
tion of the debates directly results in a marginalization of alternative
visions of society." 197 When the opinions and judicial decisions of
196. FOOT, supra note 28, at58.
197. J. Oloka-Onyango, Heretical Reflections on the Right to Self-Determination: Pros-
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powerful, Western states dominate international legal discourse, those
influential states are allowed to create the customary norms that bind
the rest of the world. The current emphasis on regional human rights
systems has detracted from the universal nature of human rights, and
has allowed states to turn inalienable human rights into merely re-
gional rights. Those rights protected only by less powerful regions are
marginalized in legal discourse, and naturally will disappear from it
entirely.
In order to prevent the marginalization of rights that is currently
underway, regional human rights arrangements must be abandoned in
favor of a centralized, universal UN system. In the words of Kofi An-
nan, "It is the universality of human rights that gives them their
strength.' 1 98  Only through a universal system of human rights en-
forcement will human rights remain "human," as opposed to "Euro-
pean," "African" or "American."
Melissa Robbins*
pects and Problems for a Democratic Global Future in the New Millennium, 15 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 151, 180 (1999).
198. Kofi Annan, Message by the United Nations Secretary-General, in REFLECTIONS ON
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (Barend van der Heijden & Bahia
Tahzib-Lie eds., 1998).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2006, California Western School of Law; B.A., English, summa
cum laude, B.S., Criminal Justice, summa cum laude, both from Northern Arizona University,
2003. Many thanks to everyone who supported me while writing this comment. Especially, I
want to thank Scarlett for her insight and encouragement, and Elie for his patience, under-
standing, and endless faith in me.
28
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 35, No. 2 [2005], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol35/iss2/5
